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Lifecycle Risk Modelling of
Complex Projects
Matthew Cook and John P.T. Mo
Abstract
Large, complex and challenging engineering projects require extensive under-
standing and management of risk. How these risks are identified at the infancy of a
project and subsequently mitigated throughout the project lifecycle is critical to
successful delivery. Many projects begin with a comprehensive attempt to identify
risks but lack the tools to manage and measure risk mitigation as the project pro-
gresses through the lifecycle causing the project to spiral out of control. This chapter
outlines details of a risk model that uses a system within a system approach of
identifying and segmenting risks. The model can then be analysed quantitatively
and generate a visual lifecycle risk profile that allows the project team to monitor
risks continuously in the project lifecycle. Furthermore, the use of a baseline or ideal
project is proposed that is used as a measure of likely success against new projects.
Keywords: risk profile, enterprise modelling, project lifecycle assessment,
supply chain risks
1. Introduction
Highly complex platform systems, such as ships, aircraft and land vehicles,
present enormous technical and financial project challenges, and these include
modifications and enhancements to their systems during their long service life.
Many project management decisions are injudicious because they are made without
a clear understanding of key risks and their consequences. This leads to budget
overruns, schedule delays, system failures and ultimately disgruntled customers [1].
When faced with managing complex projects, a strategy many engineering organi-
sations tend to adopt is the development of their own bespoke risk handling methods
which attempt to control project failures with varying degrees of success [2].
According to the international standard on risk management ISO 31000, risk is
the possibility of an undesirable event happening [3]. This definition is made up of
two aspects, the ‘severity’ of the unpleasant something, and the probability or
likelihood of this something actually ‘happening’. When undertaking extensive,
highly complex and challenging projects it is essential that any large organisation
identify and manage all risks that could preclude success.
Unfortunately, in reality it is all too common in industry for risk to be treated as
an afterthought and even in some cases seen as a box ticking exercise. It is crucial
that a strategy is developed for identifying, handling and mitigating risks to ensure
the success of the project. How well this is achieved can make or break the project
and even the organisation.
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In some organisations, the use of risk management and analysis tools may be
conducted by dedicated risk engineers who are trained in such practice. However,
in doing their work, risk engineers still rely on either project managers or engineers
working on the project to provide appropriate information for risk assessment.
While these individuals (e.g. project managers and engineers) are no doubt well
aware of possible risks relating to their project, capturing information about the
risks is often subject to influences and consideration of the relationships among
parties in the project. Consequently, outcomes can vary significantly among
different groups [4]. It is clear that a system to capture and analyse risks in a
new project either prior to commencement or at early the stages of the project
is desirable.
Risks in large engineering projects can come from many sources including
uncertainties in the work which can influence and determine cost and time of
execution. Essentially, every activity in the project has varying degrees of risk.
Traditionally, the focus is on reliability, availability, maintainability and support-
ability (RAMS) [5]. Engineering design professionals usually use methods such as
failure mode, effects & critical analysis, fault tree analysis and event tree analysis to
assess the performance in a quantitative value that is basically an indicator of risks
[6]. Modarres [7] went further to identify, rank and predict contributors to risk.
Modarres calculated probabilistic risk for different scenarios and offered some
interesting methods of presenting risk in graphical forms. This work illustrated
ways of quantifying risks and hence the possibility of ranking accordingly. Ayyub
[8] used a number of real-life examples to illustrate ways risk data can be manipu-
lated or partially used to achieve useful outcomes. Claypool et al. [9] conducted
surveys of risk management techniques with 110 managers, who believed there was
room for improvement. They particularly highlighted that little work has been
conducted into reducing risk in the supply chain which large scale engineering
projects depend heavily upon.
Abi-Karam [10] studied design-build type of construction projects and identi-
fied the risks in the proposal, pricing, project schedule, performance measures,
contractual liability and safety areas. These risks should be identified as thoroughly
as possible and managed continuously even beyond project completion.
Through their lifecycle management strategy, many organisations operate a risk
and opportunity management plan (ROMP) for business units, projects and func-
tions. Risks and opportunities are inherent in all project and business activities.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of staff to continuously manage these risks and to
promote and realise any opportunities. It is important however, to recognise that
the aim of ROMP is not to eliminate risk totally but to provide a systematic means to
proactively control and direct the business in regard to mitigating risks and pro-
moting opportunities, thus creating and protecting business value. It is noted that
the content of risk level on a project, determined as a result of mapping to the
standard ISO risk matrix [2], can vary between companies.
The common tool for risk management in large engineering organisations is a
risk register that records the opinion of project managers, engineers and other key
staff involved in the project. The process of generating this register is often very
subjective, and the assessment team may include internal and external stakeholders
such as customers and alliance partners who participate in workshops, brainstorm-
ing and project meetings.
Complex engineering projects are usually coordinated by systems engineering
methodology. It can be seen that the systems engineering approach has a more
comprehensive coverage of the project development context in relation to large
complex projects using a systems engineering management plan (SEMP) [11]. A
typical engineering project in the defence environment for example will follow a
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SEMP process usually structured to include a number of mandatory stages and
theoretical gates which need to be passed before the change can be progressed. One
of the risk management core activities during the systems engineering project
lifecycle process is incorporating risk identification, analysis and mitigations
throughout the SEMP stages. Risk assessment of the whole lifecycle in the project
development stage in many cases lacks project details/data and is not adequately
addressed at the critical early stage.
This chapter examines the SEMP and investigates whether risk management of
the project can be defined much earlier in the process. It focuses on developing a
quantitative risk model that can identify risks, develop a risk profile that can be
presented in a visual format and manage/track residual risks throughout a project’s
life cycle. The potential development of a relationship between the model and a risk
burndown chart, offers a means of associating the identified risks with both their
predicted financial and schedule impacts and what affect proposed mitigations will
achieve [12]. The focus of this chapter is to assist large organisations to identify,
visualise and manage risks throughout the lifecycle of a project. It should also be
noted that some of the methods of calculation chosen are not mandatory and the
proposed model has considered the need for flexibility to allow for alternative
interpretations and weightings. The risk burndown chart would be an ideal tool for
visualising how different strategies in the allocation of resources, financial invest-
ment, cash flow, technical challenge, etc. could affect risks [13]. A risk model is
regarded as useful if it can identify key risks from quantitative data and suggests
possible mitigation strategies. While many organisations already attend to
highlighting risks with an array of tools, software and/or process methods, their
calibre is often diminished by over-complexity and convoluted processes that are
too involved. Hence, probably the most important characteristics of a risk model
should be simplicity and ease of use.
2. Risk assessment using a system model
The main problem with a risk register is the lack of a structured methodology for
identifying risks and a systematic analysis process to determine and develop miti-
gation strategies for the complete engineering lifecycle. A generic enterprise model
is necessary to provide a quantitatively generated risk profile [14]. The model is not
intended to compete or replace current risk theory, tools or processes already
available but instead offer a novel and enhanced method for managing and impor-
tantly visualising risks throughout a project lifecycle.
The approach described in this chapter takes into account the fact that large
complex projects have several distinct stages and can last for years. This consists of
developing an understanding of the factors affecting outcomes based on the con-
tractual environment involving key stakeholders in the industry, the customer and
the community at large. The purpose of modelling is to develop a numerical indica-
tor which can be used to ameliorate the current processes involved in understanding
and managing risk throughout the project lifecycle due to changes of these factors.
In order to set some form of qualitative baseline which can then be used for
both quantitative assessment and analysis, the 3PE model (People, Process, Product
& Environment), described by Mo [15] (Figure 1) has been adopted to provide
the system framework for investigating risks surrounding complex engineering
projects [16].
In Figure 1, the physical elements of a system are shown as: the ‘product’ that is
built from fundamental engineering sciences, this is the common view of most users
and society in general. The ‘product’ is the tangible element that can usually give
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the ‘touch-and-feel’. In commercial sense, this is what the customer feels they are
paying for.
Not everyone realises that the ‘people’ element is an integral part of the system.
The element ‘people’ from the system’s point of view is not limited to the user. It
includes all human participants who are involved, one way or another, to enable
successful operation of the system to achieve its goals and applies to systems of any
nature. In engineering projects involving design and build, the people are engineers,
suppliers, technicians, managers, directors, stakeholders and customers from all
organisations having an interest in the project.
To operate the ‘product’ properly, a set of procedures, i.e. ‘process’, should be
defined and followed by everyone. The principles and practices of different people
and organisations need to be synchronised and shared. This is the realisation of
‘practices’ that are accumulated, engineered and designed to generate knowledge of
how to go about doing something and ensure success. A defined set of procedures
not only allows the ‘people’ (remember there could be many people) to synchronise
with the reactions of the system at different inputs during operation, but also
ensures the system can overcome the challenges in operation.
Needless to say, these elements are interacting among themselves as shown by
the double arrows between the elements in Figure 1. Without these interactions,
the ‘product’ is not used by ‘people’, the ‘people’ do not follow the ‘process’ and the
reaction of the ‘product’ is unpredictable. The outcome is obviously unsuccessful
operational performance.
On top of this, while the three elements are working and interacting among
themselves as a system, they co-exist within an ‘environment’. If the ‘environment’
is within the expectation of the system, the elements in the system can work and
interact correctly and produce good system performance. On the contrary, if the
‘environment’ has changed to beyond extreme conditions, the system will fail. To
Figure 1.
Product process people environment (3PE) system model.
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overcome this problem, the system has to be changed, i.e. some or all of the
elements have to be changed to adapt to the new ‘environment’. If nothing is done
to the system while the ‘environment’ has changed, the system can potentially
become out-of-date and/or obsolete.
In summary, the main elements in the 3PE model are people, process and
product, which are located within an environment [17]. For each of the elements, a
list of generic risks, more or less common to all projects was developed which were
subsequently reconfigured into baseline questions. Once the model is defined, risk
elements can be assigned and assessed. The risk indicator of a project can be
estimated from the 3PE model as a normalised distribution of risk, in this project it
is denoted by N(μj, σj), where j is a particular project.
In order to evolve the risk model further, the theory of generating a percentage
of success for a given project has been used. The hypothesis being that a ‘desirable’
project, would have minimal risk that could be easily mitigated and has a percentage
of success which can be established as the benchmark (i.e. high percentage of
success). The ‘desirable’ project is defined as a distribution N(μd, σd).
To calculate the risk of not achieving project success, the differential distribution
will show the risk of the project in relation to the ‘desirable’ project. The mean and
standard deviation can be calculated using equations:
μF ¼ μj  μd (1)
σF ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ
2
j þ σ
2
d
2
s
(2)
The risk indicator at time of measurement is then defined as:
F ¼ Pr μj  μd
 
.0
n o
(3)
The ‘desirable’ project is a reference only, it may still have some risks, but
they should be acceptable and manageable. Eq. (3) is showing the probability
of any project having a probability of failure that is greater than the ‘desirable’
project.
3. Case studies
Three projects were chosen to illustrate the methodology of calculating the risk
of a project. These projects were or are being executed in the defence environment
but the general principles of computing risk indicator F applies to all large complex
projects.
PL1. This project was completed on budget and schedule with successful
commissioning on site and acceptance by the customer. This project is
considered medium size and combined OEM equipment and a customised
installation. The normalised distribution of risk in this project is denoted by N
(μ1, σ1).
PL2. This project was conducted in an alliance between two large defence
contractors and the government. In this project, the highest risk was the need
for a new technology to be developed by one of the collaborating companies.
Since the new technology has not been substantially applied in the mission
environment, it is considered to be a significant risk surrounding the project.
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There was also considerable risk introduced by forming an alliance [18]. The
normalised distribution of risk in this project is denoted by N(μ2, σ2).
PL3. This project relates to the design, manufacture and installation of an
enhancement for a specific class of naval ships. The size of the project is
considered medium. Since the enhancement is not a complex item, the project is
considered manageable as the design, fabrication and installation is to be fully
controlled by the individual organisation. The normalised distribution of risk in
this project is denoted by N(μ3, σ3).
Risks were extracted from each of these projects, with over 150 risks being
identified. The compiled risks were then analysed for repeats and commonality
within each of the elements and a list of common risks across the three projects
established. To help focus the research in developing quantification methodology,
10 risks from each of the 3P categories (total 30 risks) were selected based on their
generic nature and applicability to the majority of past projects. Project managers,
engineers and key staff members who were involved in these projects were asked to
rate these risks on a scale of 0–10, where 0 means no risk at all and 10 means
extremely high risk. The summarised results of their ratings are shown in Table 1.
It should be noted that a higher value in Table 1 indicates a higher risk ranking.
The three projects can be represented by a normal distribution profile as shown in
Figure 2. The graph in Figure 2 can be interpreted as follows: Using PL2 as the
example. The normal distribution of PL2 is represented as N(7.4000, 2.2084).
According to statistical analysis, the probability of failure is the area under the curve.
However, the whole PL2 distribution is in the positive side of the profile, clearly
this does not mean that the probability of failure of PL2 is almost 100%. The level of
risk needs to be indicated as a relative value to some reference point or project(s).
PL1 PL2 PL3
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Product 6.8143 2.3676 7.5286 2.4800 6.2714 2.5929
Process 6.5929 2.5101 7.0214 2.1707 6.6143 2.4276
People 7.1786 2.2321 7.6500 1.9413 7.2714 2.0736
3P combined 6.8619 2.3727 7.4000 2.2084 6.7190 2.4488
Table 1.
Data analysis for three projects.
Figure 2.
Risk survey outcomes of 3P combined expressed in the form of a normal distribution.
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From the perceived understanding of the nature of the three projects, it is
generally agreed that serious challenges relating to PL2 need to be overcome and it
is therefore considered a ‘risky’ project. PL1 has actually been completed and gen-
erally considered a success, while the PL3 project is clear in scope and is found to sit
somewhere between the two. It can be seen in Figure 2 that PL2 has a higher risk
level than the other two projects (skewed more to the right). In order to develop the
risk model further, the idea of comparing to a ‘Desirable’ or ‘Ideal’ project is
explored.
As previously mentioned, the PL1 project is generally considered a successful
project (PL1 was delivered within budget and on time. It was also viewed
favourably by the customer as addressing their original need, hence why it is
considered a successful project). It can therefore be judged that its data results must
in some way align towards a ‘desirable’ project (i.e. minimal risk). To illustrate the
computational process, the ‘desirable’ project could be defined from PL1 as an
improvement of one ranking better than the PL1 data, i.e. minus one rating value.
The outcome of this improvement gives a distribution N(μd, σd) as shown in
Table 2. It should be noted that other methods of setting the benchmark ‘desirable’
project can be used, for example, survey a special expert group or find the ‘reason-
ably smooth running’ project. However, in the context of computing a risk indica-
tor/gauge for these projects, the outcome does not affect the methodology discussed
in this chapter.
Applying Eqs. (1) to (3), the differential risk profile of the three projects can
now be calculated as shown in Table 3. The data can be represented by the risk
profiles as shown in Figure 3. This set of risk profiles can be interpreted more
rationally.
In Figure 3, using PL2 as the example, the differential normal distribution of
PL2 against the ‘desirable’ project is computed by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) as N(1.5381,
4.5260). According to Eq. (3), the probability of failure is the area under the curve
at the right-hand side of the y-axis (i.e. x = 0). In this area, the risk rating of PL2 is
higher than the corresponding risk rating of the ‘desirable’ project. The area is
calculated as 63.3%. Likewise, the probability of failure of PL1 and PL3 can be
computed as 58.6 and 57.3% respectively. Please note that since the ‘desirable’
project in this case is generated from ‘improving’ upon the values of the best of the
three projects, all projects will obviously have a riskier profile than the ‘desirable’
Mean Std. dev.
Product 5.8143 2.3676
Process 5.5929 2.5101
People 6.1786 2.2321
3P combined 5.8619 3.9507
Table 2.
Data for the ‘desirable’ projects.
Mean Std. dev.
PL1 1.0000 4.6084
PL2 1.5381 4.5260
PL3 0.8571 4.6481
Table 3.
Differential risk profile data for the three case projects.
7
Lifecycle Risk Modelling of Complex Projects
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82273
project. It is theoretically possible to manage a project better than the ‘desirable’
project. In that case, the probability of failure can be reduced significantly,
approaching but not reaching zero.
4. Lifecycle risk assessment
Following the Systems Engineering V lifecycle [19] is an important decision
towards successful management of the system development process. However, each
of the stages in the systems engineering cycle is still lengthy and laden with risks.
The systems engineering approach manages projects by a process of decisions and/
or milestones.
To maintain the momentum and ascertain the right direction of development,
it is necessary to impose routine checks throughout the forward branch of the V
cycle with different level reviews. Figure 4 shows a typical systems engineering
management plan time line with different stages and reviews (sometimes known as
‘milestones’) clearly defined. Technically, the milestones serve as ‘gates’ that control
the flow of the project. If the design or progress is not acceptable, the systems
team is not allowed to start work towards the next review, hence it is a ‘go or
no-go’ gate.
Please note that these reviews are the minimum number of checks that should be
installed in the forward systems design cycle. More frequent, and less formal
reviews can happen at any time and anywhere in the duration.
Initially Figure 4 looks complicated but it is basically a representation of all
project activities in parallel. Starting from the top bar which represents the activities
to prepare a site, this line of activities will go through three reviews: system
requirements review (SRR), preliminary design review (PDR), and critical design
review (CDR). The sub-system ‘user system’ on the next bar will go through four
reviews: concept design review (CoDR), SRR, PDR, CDR. The sub-system of ‘inte-
gration and test facility’ are complimentary outcomes of the next few design activ-
ities and it will be synchronised with those activities according to the red links. The
most important sub-systems are represented by the next three bars, in this case:
high resolution receiver, power system and signal processing. These sub-systems
require a final pre-production review (PRR) before going into actual manufacture.
Two other reviews important to the cycle are the site acceptance test (SAT) and test
readiness review (TRR). Both these tests will involve the customer and reference
verification to the user requirements.
Figure 3.
Risk profile expressed as a normal distribution.
8
Perspectives on Risk, Assessment and Management Paradigms
The estimated success probability of the project at milestone i can be estimated
using equation:
Fi ¼ Pr μji  μd
 
.0
n o
(4)
Hence, the estimated failure probability in this milestone is given by:
Ri ¼ 1 Fi (5)
To determine the change of probability in the lifecycle, each of the process
stages (in theory) should reduce or mitigate project known risks [20]. Therefore, if
the project is progressing though the lifecycle as forecast, the risks of previous
stages should be mitigated or resolved to the expected level. Post each stage, the
project risk then comprises of the risks in achieving the remaining milestones. A
way of representing this mathematically, is by the logic of compound events that
are in series. If there areMmilestones in the project, the project probability of
success of the kth milestones is the product of probability of success of all mile-
stones from milestone k:
Rk ¼
YM
i¼k
Ri (6)
Therefore, the risk of the project at milestone k is given by:
Fk ¼ 1
YM
i¼k
Ri (7)
With the formula for estimating the risk of a project at the different milestones
established, the next challenge is to determine how the success index and standard
deviation of a complex project can be reasonably estimated. This leads finally to the
Figure 4.
Systems engineering management plan (for a communication system design) forward cycle with reviews.
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calculation for the overall project success index, which is essentially a means of
accurately estimating/forecasting based on a known range of required activities
within the project.
As defined earlier, the 3PE model elements are people, process and product,
located within an environment. A list of activities for each element and relevant
interactions between these elements can be established and thus a holistic view of
the project can be formulated. The organisations systems engineering team can then
estimate the success index levels separately for each element. The sum of risks for
each of the project stages can then be presented as a risk level or profile of the
project. However, it should be noted that this profile represents a snapshot of the
risks in the system at a single moment in time.
Any activity in a project can be assessed by combining the 3PE indices. The
indices of activity j in milestone i can be denoted by μji, and σij. The estimated
success index is now combined with both the desirable project mean index and the
standard deviation. If normal distribution for all activity indices in milestone i is
assumed, and there are α activities in the milestone, the resulting combined distri-
bution of the milestone i is N sji; σji
 
, where
sri ¼
∑αj¼1srij
α
(8)
σri ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑αj¼1σ
2
rij
α
s
(9)
The probability of success is calculated with Eq. (4) and the overall or holistic
project risk for a milestone can then be computed by Eq. (7). Again, it is worth
highlighting that the identified risks of previous stages should be resolved and/or
reduced (preferable approaching zero) as the project progresses through the
lifecycle. It is then possible to plot risk levels against the project stages to visually
highlight the reduction.
5. Lifecycle risk assessment: worked example
For this worked example, the theoretical risk profiling methodology is applied to a
logistics improvement project as an illustration of the process. The company employs
approx. 3000 staff at the time of writing and was undergoing a series of significant
changes. In order to stay competitive, the organisation is developing a transportation
network that will support its just-in-time (JIT) supply chain. However, to apply
Eqs. (3) and (4), a conceptual desirable project is necessary. From the authors’
previous experience on similar process improvement projects, it is desirable to set the
mean success index and its standard deviation at sd = 4.5, and σd = 0.5 respectively. It
should be noted once again that the desirable project values used in this example are
for illustration purposes only. Other methods of setting the benchmark or desirable
project can be used as explained earlier. The scale used in this research is linear from
0 to 10 with 0 being no chance of success (sure failure) to 10 (being sure success).
After integrating the project’s SEMP, the lifecycle process can be divided into six
stages: (1) plan, (2) define, (3) preliminary design, (4) detailed design, (5) build,
(6) deploy and close. At each milestone of the process, certain activities can be
identified and these are aligned under the 3PE model elements as shown in Table 4.
Each of the activities within the 3PE elements were assessed using a three-point
estimate by the systems engineer of this project. The scale is the same as that used
for the desirable project.
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Plan Define Preliminary
design
Detailed design Build Deploy and close
Product • Statement of
requirements
• Existing
ineffective JIT
• Transportation
network
• New
technology
• Scanning
• Wireless
communication
• Value stream
analysis
• Software limitation
• Subsystem detail design
• Microsoft tools
• Geocoding technology
• CZAR rating system
• Optimization technologies
• Implementation process • Project
management
Process • Software
system
methodology
• Root
definition
• System of
systems
methodology
• Strategic
assumption
surfacing and
testing
• Build variation
and manual
checking
• Define problem
context (system
requirements)
• Hard system
definition
• System and user
requirements
• Environmental
factors
• Operational plan
• Dynamic operation environment,
applicability to wide variety of
situations, improved tracking of
original orders, VSCM network design
technology
• Key performance
indicators, cost
effectiveness, lifecycle
costing
• Standard
operating
procedure
People • Logistics Team • Group
formation
• Bargaining
power of service
providers
• Training • Delivery • Supply chain
management
Process/
product
• Define context • Supplier
constraints
• Loading plan
• Input/
packaging
• Vehicle profile
• Equipment
MGOA system
• Threat of
substitute
• Linear regression
analysis
• Transportation standard compliance
• Modelling and data parameters
preparation
• System testing and
validation
• System function
architecture verification
• System synthesis
development
• Process
standardisation
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Plan Define Preliminary
design
Detailed design Build Deploy and close
Process/
people
• Roles and
responsibilities
• Declared
assumptions
• Synthesis
• Government
policy
• System dynamic
• Business case
approval
• Batch routing software
• Scheduled network pooling,
integration
• Time-based schedule windows
• Reports and business graphics
• Data validation and scrubbing
• Cubic calculation origin destination
• Ready to deploy
documentation
• Extent of
compliance
Product/
people
• Knowledge of
people in
position
• Project profile
approval
• Establish
baseline model
principle
• Baseline
prediction and
adjustments
• Communication user interface,
Geographical data and sharing,
Shipment information linear code
reporting
• Line haul route design
• System implementation • System
debugging and
upgrade
Product/
people/
process
• CATWOE • System support • System
breakdown
structure
• Identify
subsystems and
attributes
• New
transportation
network
overview
• Individual city
considerations
• Validation • System performance
indicators
• Extent of
compliance
Table 4.
3PE model of logistics system improvement project.
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By applying Eqs. (1) and (2) to the quantified 3PE elements, the numbers can be
converted to normal distributions. As an illustration, the Process element is used to
demonstrate the analytic process as shown in Table 5.
Using the means of the 3PE elements at each milestone and compared to the
conceptual desirable project represented by a normal distribution N(4.5, 0.5), the
risk distribution of the SEMP cycle can be summarised in Table 6.
Combining the lifecycle risk of each 3PE element,, the risk levels at each mile-
stone can be computed in Table 7.
The overall risk is plotted as a ‘risk burn down’ graph which highlights that
initially at the planning stage of the project, there are many unknowns and uncer-
tainties in the project (including those downstream) and the risk is considerably
high. See Figure 5.
The risk computation as shown in Table 5 indicates that some activities are
risky, e.g. ‘product’ (in this case, implementation of the JIT transportation network
Milestone Activity Pess. Nrm. Opt. srij σrij sri σri
Plan Software system methodology 3 5 6 5.500 0.316 1.000 0.418
Root definition 5 6 6
Define System of systems methodology 2 5 7 4.556 0.460 0.056 0.480
Strategic assumption surfacing and
testing
3 4 5
Build variation and manual
checking
3 5 6
Prel. design Define problem context (system
requirements)
3 5 6 4.333 0.422 0.167 0.462
Hard system definition 3 4 6
System and user requirements 3 5 6
Environmental factors 3 3 4
Operational plan 3 5 5
Detail
design
Dynamic operation environment 1 3 4 3.667 0.380 0.833 0.444
Applicability to wide variety of
situations
3 5 6
Improved tracking of original
orders
3 4 5
VSCM network design technology 2 3 4
Build Life cycle costing 5 7 8 5.667 0.715 1.167 0.617
Alternatives evaluation 3 6 9
Logistics support analysis 3 5 6
Technical factors (operational
effectiveness)
4 8 9
Key performance indicators 3 4 5
Economic factors
(cost-effectiveness)
3 5 6
Deploy and
close
Standard operating procedure 3 5 6 4.833 0.707 0.333 0.612
Table 5.
Expanded 3PE process element.
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Ri of element Fi of element Fk of element at milestone k
Product
Plan 0.7069 0.2931 0.6380
Define 0.9347 0.3393 0.4879
Preliminary design 0.7069 0.5329 0.4521
Detail design 0.7984 0.6271 0.2249
Build 0.9853 0.6326 0.0292
Deploy/close 0.9853 0.6380 0.0147
Process
plan 0.9916 0.0084 0.9960
Define 0.5461 0.4585 0.9959
Preliminary design 0.3593 0.8055 0.9925
Detail design 0.0303 0.9941 0.9792
Build 0.9707 0.9943 0.3138
Deploy/close 0.7069 0.9960 0.2931
People
plan 0.9650 0.0350 0.8297
Define 0.7069 0.3179 0.8235
Preliminary design 0.7069 0.5178 0.7503
Detail design 0.7069 0.6591 0.6468
Build 0.7069 0.7590 0.5003
Deploy/close 0.7069 0.8297 0.2931
Process/product
plan 0.7069 0.2931 0.8141
Define 0.9475 0.3302 0.7371
Preliminary design 1.0000 0.3302 0.7225
Detail design 0.9768 0.3458 0.7225
Build 0.4019 0.7371 0.7159
Deploy/close 0.7069 0.8141 0.2931
Process/people
plan 0.7069 0.2931 0.8039
Define 0.8277 0.4149 0.7225
Preliminary design 0.7968 0.5338 0.6648
Detail design 0.7731 0.6396 0.5792
Build 0.7069 0.7452 0.4558
Deploy/close 0.7699 0.8039 0.2301
Product/people
plan 0.8227 0.1773 0.6123
Define 0.7699 0.3666 0.5287
Preliminary design 0.7872 0.5014 0.3879
Detail design 0.9795 0.5116 0.2224
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system) at the ‘deploy/close’ stage has high probability of failure. The main uncer-
tainty at this stage of the project was ‘project management’. This is reflected by the
fact that some resources have been redirected to other work when the JIT supply
chain was close to completion.
The risk burndown plot can be used to verify the logical outcome of the project,
i.e. as the project progresses through the lifecycle, many risks would have been
Ri of element Fi of element Fk of element at milestone k
Build 0.8175 0.6007 0.2061
Deploy/close 0.9711 0.6123 0.0289
Product/people/process (all three)
plan 0.8227 0.1773 0.9987
Define 0.9968 0.1799 0.9984
Preliminary design 0.9788 0.1973 0.9984
Detail design 0.7069 0.4326 0.9984
Build 0.8227 0.5332 0.9977
Deploy/close 0.0027 0.9987 0.9973
Table 6.
Risk distributions at each SEMP stage.
Product Process People Process/
product
Process/
people
Product/
people
Product/
people/process
Overall
Plan 0.6380 0.9960 0.8297 0.8141 0.8039 0.6123 0.9987 0.8132
Define 0.4879 0.9959 0.8235 0.7371 0.7225 0.5287 0.9984 0.7563
Prel.
design
0.4521 0.9925 0.7503 0.7225 0.6648 0.3879 0.9984 0.7098
Detail
design
0.2249 0.9792 0.6468 0.7225 0.5792 0.2224 0.9984 0.6248
Build 0.0292 0.3138 0.5003 0.7159 0.4558 0.2061 0.9977 0.4598
Deploy/
close
0.0147 0.2931 0.2931 0.2931 0.2301 0.0289 0.9973 0.3072
Table 7.
Overall project risk at different milestones.
Figure 5.
Risk burndown plot.
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resolved and thus the probability of failure or risk level should sequentially
decrease. Failure of the project to follow this theory is an indication that the risks
are not being managed as forecast.
6. Conclusion
This chapter combines the probability of success of every activity at each mile-
stone of a project lifecycle based on a systems engineering process. The method uses
an enterprise network model to study a manufacturing company’s risk of undertak-
ing a change project to re-design its logistics system in terms of planning, monitor-
ing and validating of the network efficiency and criticality. Several key changes have
been put in place and their risks in the system’s lifecycle development are assessed
within the enterprise network model to ensure greater probability of success.
The 3PE modelling framework provides a logical foundation for quantifying the
risks of an engineering project. By assessing the expected level of achievable out-
come in comparison against a ‘desirable’ project, this research has developed a novel
method of generating a quantified risk indicator that can provide the basis for
future planning improvements and hence the successful execution of complex
engineering project. The use of a risk burndown plot allows an organisation to
visualise the level of risk that has been burnt-down at each stage of lifecycle. In
addition, the 3PE model provides a method for modelling different scenarios and
the ability to assess their effectiveness at burning down risks.
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